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Abstract
According to many studies, childcare is important for its pedagogical, economical and social
function for both children and parents. However, many households are still confronted with
availability constraints in childcare. In the recent past, many governments implemented policy
reforms in order to increase the coverage rate of childcare. The empirical part of this paper focuses
on the Flemish childcare market and analyzes how maternal labour supply and childcare usage is
affected by a new Flemish decree which provides full childcare coverage.
This paper adopts a modeling framework for analyzing labour supply developed by Aaberge,
Colombino and Strøm (1999) and Dagsvik (1994). To account for the possible interaction between
labour supply and childcare choices the model also treats childcare type as an endogenous variable.
The results of the policy reform analysis show that households switch to formal childcare when
confronted with higher childcare availability. Total labour supply also increases but these effects
are less pronounced as some households also reduce working hours.
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1 Introduction
Proponents of policy reforms towards more and cheaper childcare with higher quality offer two main
arguments. First, childcare is seen as a way to make time available for parents to engage in market
work. As such, childcare is a key factor in the employment decision of parents, and in particular of
mothers. Second, and according to many studies as important as the first argument (Jacob, 2009),
childcare contributes to the cognitive and social skills of the child in early development. Hence, there
have been a number of important policy initiatives towards more childcare in the recent past. For
example, the Barcelona childcare targets of 2002 by the European Council state that each country
should provide childcare by 2010 to at least 90% of children between three years old and the mandatory
school age and to at least 33% of children under three years of age.
In line with the above arguments, in April 2012, the Flemish Parliament approved a new decree
containing adjustments to the current childcare policy. The new decree constitutes of three main
objectives. First, every household in need of childcare should find a suitable and affordable place
within a reasonable time span and distance from their home. By 2016, the Flemish government aims
at a coverage rate of 50% and by 2020, the supply of childcare must match childcare demand entirely.
Making childcare more affordable for households and providing an official institution for the search of
childcare are other objectives to make childcare more accessible for parents. Second, each childcare
facility is obliged to have a legal authorization and to fulfill the necessary requirements related to the
quality of the services provided and children’s safety. Third, the current childcare sector consists of
several types of care, each with their own stipulations and rules of subsidies. The new decree aims
at a simplification of this childcare structure. The main purpose of this paper is to analyze how the
first objective; i.e. making childcare more available, affects the labour supply and childcare decisions
of Flemish households.
This paper adopts the random utility labour supply model used by Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strom
(1995). Aaberge et al. (1995) explicitly allow for heterogeneity in the opportunity set in which each
element is characterized by the amount of hours of work, wage rate and other non-pecuniary attributes.
By contrast, in the traditional discrete labour supply methodology, as suggested by Van Soest (1995)
, each individual faces the same choice set and each job only contains the amount of hours and other
job attributes are neglected. This paper extends the former methodology to account for the possible
interaction between labour supply and childcare choice. Each household is now confronted with a
household-specific opportunity set that is characterized by the amount of hours of work, wage rate,
type of childcare and other non-pecuniary attributes. This type of modeling appears very convenient
as the Flemish childcare sector is characterized by a large variation in childcare supply. There are
indications that all three forms of non-parental childcare (informal, formal subsidized and formal
non-subsidized) are confronted with excess demand. Hence, some households face larger opportunity
sets than others; an element that is explicitly included in our type of modeling.
This model is estimated on a subsample of the Flemish Families and Care Survey of 2005 that
contains detailed information about childcare utilization, working hours of parents, household income
and other household characteristics. The estimation and simulation results suggest that Flemish
2
households alter their childcare and labour supply decision when the coverage rate of formal childcare
increases. Parents decide to switch from informal childcare arrangements to formal childcare. Both
labour supply effects at the intensive and extensive margin of the labour market are observed. Many
households that used to be rationed in their childcare choice have now the opportunity to start
working. However, the labour supply effects at the intensive margin of the labour market are not
straightforward. Switching to paid childcare implies two competing substitution and income effects.
Switching from free childcare (informal or no care) to formal paid care implies an income effect that
leads to an increase in labour supply and a substitution effect that reduces labour supply. Households
now have to pay childcare costs which implies that they need to work more hours in order to obtain
the same amount of income; an income effect. On the other hand, childcare leads to a decrease in
wages which results in cheaper leisure and, given that leisure is a normal good, lower labour supply;
a substitution effect. Therefore, it is not unambiguously clear how labour supply adjusts when the
availability of childcare increases. Our results suggest that total labour supply slightly increases.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in multiple ways. First, it accounts for the simul-
taneous decision of childcare and labour supply, which acknowledges the fact that childcare opportu-
nities in Flanders vary significantly across municipalities. Second, to the best of our knowledge, the
simultaneous labour supply and childcare choice has never been estimated before in Belgium. Hence,
this work provides a tool to investigate how policy reforms in Belgium might lead to behavioural
responses of households.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of studies related to childcare
and labour supply. Section 3 discusses the institutional childcare context in Flanders and provides
details about the new Flemish childcare decree. The methodology is explained in Section 4 and
Section 5 provides an overview of the dataset that is used in the empirical part of the paper. The
estimation results and behavioural responses of the new Flemish decree are given in respectively
Section 6 and Section 7. The last section concludes.
2 Literature review
There exists a large amount of studies analyzing parental labour supply decisions and childcare
choices. Anderson and Levine (1999) , Brewer and Paull (2004) and Kalb (2009) provide overviews
of the existing studies related to childcare and labour supply. Different methodologies have been
applied to investigate the link between parental, and in particular mother’s, labour supply decisions
and the demand for childcare. Both ex-post methods, such as (quasi-) experimental studies, as ex-
ante methods, such as reduced-form estimation and structural models, have been used to analyze this
specific link.1
Independently from the type of methodology, the literature about labour supply and childcare
demand can be broadly classified into two categories depending on the justifications for the demand
for childcare. The first stream, known as the Cost of Working approach, considers childcare only as a
way to make time available for parents to engage in market work. As such, childcare only forms part of
1We refer to Brewer and Paull (2004) for a detailed overview of these studies.
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the costs of working and the demand for care is completely determined by the parental labour supply
decision. The main advantage of this type of modeling is that it simplifies a more complicated model
in the case where the main focus is not on modeling parental childcare demand but there is still a need
to include childcare in a minimal way. Hence, most studies in this stream of the literature focus only
on the parental labour supply decision and are therefore unable to explain why some households still
demand childcare when both parents are not working. Studies whose main purpose is to model both
the childcare and labour supply decision mostly allow for other justifications for childcare demand,
such as the quality of different types of care and educational and development opportunities for
the children. In this second stream, known as the Simultaneous approach, households make their
employment and childcare decisions simultaneously and investigate the link between both, rather
than only focusing on the former.
Many studies have put emphasis on the price of childcare to explain labour market behaviour
and childcare demand. Expensive childcare might lead to situations in which parents, or at least
one of both spouses, decide not to participate in the labour market to take care of their children
themselves, and hence, not to demand childcare. The main conclusion from these types of studies is
that childcare costs negatively influence labour supply. In the more recent literature, the focus has
shifted from the cost of childcare to its availability and accessibility. It might be that some parents
are willing to use childcare at the going market price but cannot find a place, leading to an excess
demand for childcare. This literature provides mixed evidence of the size and sign of the effect of
these availability constraints on labour supply. For Germany, Hank and Kreyenfeld (2000) employ a
multinomial logit model to estimate how the availability of public and informal day-care arrangements
affect female labour-force participation. The authors find no significant effect of regional childcare
provision on female labor-force participation. Wrohlich (2011), on the other hand, does find significant
labour supply effects in Germany after increasing the availability of childcare. Wrohlich (2011) models
labour supply and childcare demand in a discrete framework in which availability restrictions of formal
childcare are explicitly taken into account in the budgetconstraint of each household. Del Boca (2002)
, Del Boca and Vuri (2007) and Brilli et al. (2011) also find positive labour supply effects of childcare
availability in Italy. These studies restrict the choice set according to a simulated probability of being
rationed in the childcare sector. Kornstad and Thoresen (2007) assume that each household faces a
household specific choice set from which they can choose. Hence, labour supply and childcare choices
are outcomes of discrete choices from finite sets of jobs and childcare arrangements, where each job
is assumed to have fixed working hours, a wage rate and a number of non-pecuniary attributes and
each care alternative has fixed opening hours, a specific care price and different quality attributes.
Excess demand of childcare is reflected in these opportunity sets where households that face a higher
degree of rationing in childcare have fewer childcare options to choose from.
The approach presented in this paper has some similarities to Kornstad and Thoresen (2007) and
is further explained in Section 4.
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3 Institutional childcare context
The landscape of childcare in Belgium, and more specifically in Flanders, can be devided in two
categories: formal and informal childcare. Within the formal childcare sector, both subsidized and
non-subsidized childcare facilities can be distinguished. The former receive cost-covering subsidies
while the latter do not and only need to register. The informal childcare, i.e. childcare provided by
(mostly) grandparents and close relatives, is another important childcare channel but its importance
is decreasing over time, as discussed in Hedebouw and Peetermans (2009).
The childcare fee differs according to the type and amount of care demanded. Formal subsidized
childcare providers are obliged to apply a legally determined means-tested tariff structure. The daily
price per child lies between a minimum price of 1.28 Euro and a maximum price of 22.82 euro, with an
average in 2005 of 13.5 Euro/day. Non-subsidized providers of formal childcare are free to determine
the price they charge. According to Hedebouw and Peetermans (2009), the average daily price ranges
between 17.2 Euro and 21.2 Euro, which is considerably higher than the average fee in the subsidized
formal childcare sector.
A 2007-study shows that 10% of all parents that are actively searching for childcare in Flanders
were not able to find a suitable childcare place after a search period of six months (MAS,2007)). Not
finding childcare might have important consequences for the parental labour supply decision as these
households stop working or reduce the amount of hours worked. There is evidence that households face
availability restrictions in all three types of childcare, as suggested by Vandelannoote et al. (2013).
First, some households do not have the option to bring their children to their grandparents. A more
active ageing where grandparents are still working and do not have time to look after the children
is one of the possible explanations. Living to far away from the grandparents is another possible
reasons for this lack of availability. Second, the supply of formal subsidized and non-subsidized
childcare differs greatly among the 340 municipalities in Flanders. The average coverage rate of
subsidized childcare equals 24% and 11% for non-subsidized childcare, leading to an average coverage
rate of formal childcare in general of 35%, which is relatively high in comparison to other European
countries.2 Nevertheless, this does not mean that availability of formal childcare is not an issue in
Flanders. While one small municipality has a coverage rate of formal childcare of over 100%, the
95th percentile’s coverage rate is only 54% reflecting the huge variation in coverage rates among
the different municipalities. Hence, there is strong evidence that different types of households face
different childcare opportunities than other types of households.
In the near future, the Flemish childcare landscape will face some major reforms. In April 2012, the
Flemish Parliament approved a new decree containing adjustments to the current childcare policy.
They are convinced that childcare is important for both children and parents for its pedagogic,
economic and social function. A reform of the current childcare policy is necessary in order to
fully capture these three aspects. The new decree constitutes of three main objectives. First, every
household in need of childcare should find a suitable and affordable place within a reasonable time
2The coverage rate is defined as the amount of full-time slots as a percentage of children below the age of three years
living in this specific municipality.
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span and distance from their home. By 2016, the Flemish government aims at a coverage rate of 50%
and by 2020, the supply of childcare must equal childcare demand entirely. Making childcare more
affordable for households and providing an official institution for the search of childcare are other
objectives to make childcare more available and accessible for parents. Second, each childcare facility
will be obliged to have the legal authorization for childcare and to fulfill the necessary requirements
related to the quality of the services provided and children’s safety. Third, the current childcare
sector consists of several types of care, each with their own stipulations and rules of subsidies. The
new decree aims at a simplification of this childcare structure. The main purpose of this paper is to
investigate whether parents actually alter their childcare and labour supply decisions when childcare
availability increases.
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4 Methodology
This section starts by presenting an overview how labour supply is modeled in the literature. The
second part explains how this framework can be used to include the simultaneous choice of labour
supply and childcare.
4.1 Labour supply modeling
The last decades witnessed substantial progress in modeling labour supply behaviour.3 Up to the
nineties, the traditional way of ex-ante labour supply modeling was in a continuous way, see Hausman
and Ruud (1986) and Arrufat and Zabalza (1986), where any hours of work is equally available in
the market. The household selects the best combination of labour supply and consumption so as
to maximize its utility function, given a time and budget constraint. However, as pointed out by
Aaberge et al. (1999), this traditional way of modeling suffers from both quantitative and qualitative
restrictions. The former relates to the assumption of uniformly distributed offered hours of work that
is rather unrealistic as the structure of labour costs makes it less attractive to firms to offer contracts
that allow for flexible work schedules and, hence, the available choice set for each individual might
be severely reduced. Secondly, the traditional way of modeling labour supply faces an important
qualitative restriction as households choose among jobs that are only characterized by the amount
of hours. As such, other job attributes such as the sector of the job are neglected but might be
important characteristics of the job that influence the household’s decision.
In order to overcome these problems, several empirical studies of labour supply models tried to
account for these restrictions. Van Soest (1995) applies the discrete random utility maximization
model (RUM) initiated by Daniel McFadden (1974) in order to give answer to the quantitative
restriction of the traditional way of modeling labour supply.4 In this methodology, the optimal
labour supply choice is modeled in terms of a comparison of the utility levels at different discrete
labour supply points. Households do not longer have the choice from a continuous labour supply
choiceset but are restricted to some discrete hours points such as inactivity, part-time and full-time
work. Introducing a random utility term which is assumed to be distributed according to an extreme
value distribution leads to an easy expression for the probability that any particular discrete labour
supply point is chosen. These models are structural in a sense that there is no reduced form labour
supply function which depends on wages and the amount of hours worked but that the structural
parameters for preference for consumption and leisure are identified out of an a priori functional form
of the utility function. For Belgium in particular, this type of methodology has been applied for in
Decoster et al. (2006), Orsini (2006), Orsini (2007) and Decoster and Vanleenhove (2012).
This type of methodology, known as the conventional discrete labour supply approach, however,
still has an important quantitative restriction. Van Soest (1995) assumes that each individual faces
the same choiceset of discrete points. However, it might be that highly skilled individuals face
3We refer to Keane and Rogerson (2012) for a detailed overview.
4McFadden (1974) applied these random utility models to several transport and occupational choices. He considered
these choices as discrete.
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different opportunity sets with more full-time positions than low educated individuals. Secondly, in
line with the traditional way of modeling labour supply, Van Soest (1995) assumes that jobs are only
characterized by the amount of hours and, hence, neglects potentially important other job attributes.
Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995), Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm (1999) and Aaberge, Colom-
bino and Wennemo (2009) present a methodology that gives an answer to both the quantitative and
qualitative restrictions from the previous models. Each individual faces an individual specific op-
portunity set that contains jobs that are characterized by the amount of hours, a job-specific wage
rate and other (un)observable job characteristics such as the sector of the job or the atmosphere at
work. Including these individual specific opportunity sets is important as differences in choices of
individuals can be assigned to both differences in preferences and/or opportunities. In contrast, in
the conventional discrete labour supply approach the choice of each household is assumed to be driven
by preferences only. For Belgium, this type of labour supply modeling has already been applied in
Dagsvik et al. (2011).
The work presented in this paper extends the modeling framework developed by Aaberge et al.
(1995) with the choice of childcare that can be seen as an additional job characteristic. As discussed
in Section 3, there is a large variation in the supply of the different types of childcare among the
municipalities in Flanders. Individuals who live in a rather rural area and/or live far away from
their parents face completely different opportunities in childcare than similar households that are
living near their parents in an urban area. Hence, the framework suggested in Aaberge, Dagsvik and
Strøm (1995) that explicitly models these individual specific opportunity sets is uttermost useful for
modeling the simultaneous labour supply and childcare type choice in Flanders.
4.2 Labour supply - childcare model
Each single agent is confronted with an individual specific opportunity set B in which each element
can be characterized by four elements:5
1. Amount of hours worked h
2. Gross hourly wage w
3. Unobserved characteristics k such as commuting time and neighbourhood of workplace and
childcare facility, etc.
4. Type of childcare:
aj =
1 if childcare type jis used0 otherwise ,
5Note that, for reasons of simplicity, we do not include a household specific index i. We also focus on the single
agent case. As discussed in Section 5, the model is estimated on couple households with full-time working father and
we only focus on the maternal labour supply decision. Hence, the single agent model is used in the empirical part of
the paper.
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for j = 1, 2, 3, 4. Given that each child can only use 1 option, we have that
4∑
j=1
aj = 1. As discussed in
Section 3 and Section 5, four different childcare types are considered; no childcare, formal subsidized
care, formal non-subsidized care and informal care. The amount of hours of childcare is not modeled
due to lack of reliable information.
Each opportunity set B consists of market and non-market opportunities. A market opportunity
is characterized by strictly positive hours h, positive wages w and type of childcare j. A non-
market opportunity, on the other hand, is defined as a point in which the single agent is not working
(h = w = 0) and chooses a type of childcare j. As such, this implies that households might have the
option to demand any type of childcare, even when they are not working. Additionally, we define p0j
and p1j as the proportion of respectively non-market and market opportunities with type of childcare
j in the opportunity set B with j=1, 2, 3, 4. The sum of these proportions has to equal 1:
1∑
i=0
4∑
j=1
pij = 1. (1)
Additionally, we say that Bj is the set of market opportunities with childcare type j with
j=1, 2, 3, 4. The sum of these opportunity sets equals the total amount of market opportunities
in the total opportunity set B. We further define g(h,w, j) as the conditional density of choice op-
portunities with hours h, wages w and childcare type j with j=1, 2, 3, 4. As such, they represent the
relative frequency of opportunities with hours h, wages w and childcare type j.
We assume that each household chooses a point in his or her opportunity set by maximizing the
following utility function:
U (f(wh), I), h, z, k) = v (f(wh, I), h, z) · ε(w, h, z, k), (2)
where f represents the tax-benefit system that transforms gross income into disposable income and
I equals the amount of non-labour income. Total household utility U consists of a deterministic part
v, which is known to both researcher and household, and a random part ε that accounts for other
unobserved preference characteristics.6 We assume that household utility depends on the amount
of hours worked h, total net disposable income f(wh, I) and the type of childcare used z with z =
1, 2, 3, 4.
We assume the random term ε to be independently and identically distributed according to an
extreme value type I distribution. It can be shown that, given this assumption and equation (2), the
probability that a household chooses a job with characteristics(w, h, z) can be written as follows:7
6These preference characteristics are unobserved for the researcher, not necessarily for the household.
7We refer to Aaberge et al. (1999) and Aaberge and Colombino (2013) for this derivation.
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f(w, h, z) = Pr
[
U (f(wh, I), h, z) = max
(x,y,j)∈B
U (f(xy, I), y, j)
]
=
v (w, h, z) · p(w, h, z)
4∑
j=1
´
(x,y)∈B
v (x, y, j) · p(x, y, j) · dx · dy
, (3)
in which p(w, h, z) stands for the probability density function of jobs with wage rate w, amount of
hours h and type of childcare z. Intuitively, Equation (3) reflects that the probability of a specific
choice (w, h, z) can be seen as the relative attractiveness of jobs of this specific type, weighted by a
measure of availability of this choice p(w, h, z).
In the empirical specification of the model, we specify that:
p(w, h, j) =
p1j · g(w, h, j) if h > 0p0j if h = 0 , (4)
for j=1, 2, 3, 4. For the market opportunities, the probability density p(w, h, j) equals the share of
market jobs with childcare type j, p1j , multiplied with the conditional density of jobs with wages w,
hours h and childcare type j. In the non-market case where h equals zero, the proportion of non-
market opportunities with childcare type j (p0j) is sufficient to know the probability of this specific
choice.
Given Equation (3) and (4), it can be shown that the probability density for choosing a market
opportunity job with h hours, w wage rate and type of childcare z can be written as:
φ(w, h, z) = Pr
[
U (f(wh, I), h, z) = max
(x,y,j)∈B
U (f(xy, I), y, j)
]
=
v (w, h, z) · p1z · g(w, h, z)
D
(5)
for {w, h} > 0 and z=1, 2, 3, 4, the probability density for choosing a non-market opportunity job
with 0 hours, 0 wage rate and type of childcare z can be written as:
φ(0, 0, z) = Pr
[
U (f(0, I), 0, z) = max
(x,y,j)∈B
U (f(x, I), y, j)
]
=
v (0, 0, z) · p0z
D
(6)
for z = 1, 2, 3, 4, where the denominator D is given by:
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D =
4∑
j=1
[v(0, 0, j) · p0j ] +
4∑
j=1
[ˆ
(x,y)Bj
v(x, y, j) · p1j · g(x, y, j) · dx · dy
]
. (7)
For convenience in the next derivations, the denominator can be rewritten as follows:
D = v(0, 0, 1) · p01 +
4∑
j=2
[v(0, 0, j) · p0j ] +
4∑
j=1
[ˆ
(x,y)Bj
v(x, y, j) · p1j · g(x, y, j) · dx · dy
]
, (8)
in which we have split up the non-market opportunities.
In the empirical specification of the model, we assume that offered hours, offered wages and offered
type of childcare are independently distributed. As explained in Aaberge and Colombino (2013), the
independence of offered hours and wages can be justified by the fact that hours are normally set in
rather infrequent negotiations between employers and employees associations, while there are far more
wage negotiations in which hourly wages do not depend on hours worked. Hedebouw and Peetermans
(2009) show that there is no evidence that the type of childcare chosen depends on the amount of
hours worked and wage received. Hence, it is realistic to assume that the offered hours and offered
wages are independently distributed from offered childcare type.8
Additionally, we specify that q1j =
p1j
p01
for j={1, 2, 3, 4} which can be seen as the fraction of the
proportion of market opportunities with childcare type j=1, 2, 3, 4 over the proportion of non-market
opportunities without childcare. We also define q0j =
p0j
p01
for j={1, 2, 3, 4} which are the fractions of
the proportion of non-market opportunities with childcare type j = 1, 2, 3, 4 over the proportion of
non-market opportunities without childcare. Thus, we specify the density of opportunities as follows:
q1j · g(w, h, j) = g1(w) · g2(h) · g3(j) , (9)
for j=1, 2, 3, 4 and where g1(w), g2(h) and g3(j) are respectively the densities of wages, offered hours
and childcare type for market opportunities.
For estimation purposes, we divide both numerator and denominator by p01. Given these assump-
tions, we can rewrite Equation (5) and Equation (6) as follows:
φ(w, h, z) =
v (w, h, z) · g1(w) · g2(h) · g3(z)
∼
D
(10)
for z = 1, 2, 3, 4 and
8Note that their might be a link between the offered hours and offered childcare hours but as we only model type
of childcare, this is not relevant for this work.
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φ(0, 0, 1) =
v (0, 0, 1)
∼
D
(11)
for the non-market opportunity without childcare (z = 1) and
φ(0, 0, z) =
v (0, 0, z) · q0z(z)
∼
D
(12)
for the non-market opportunities with z = 2, 3, 4, where the denominator is equal to:
∼
D = v(0, 0, 1) +
4∑
j=2
[v(0, 0, j) · q0j ]
+
4∑
j=1
[ˆ
(x,y)Bj
v(x, y, j) · g1(x) · g2(y) · g3(j) · dx · dy
]
. (13)
Given Equations (10)-(13), the individual likelihood contributions can be constructed and the
preference parameters can be estimated.
4.3 Empirical specification of the model
We denote net disposable income that results from the tax-benefit system f as follows:
f(wh, I) = C (14)
The deterministic part of utility is specified according to a Box-Cox utility function and is given by:
log v(C, h, j) = α2
(
Cα1 − 1
α1
)
+
β0 + β1ch46 + β2ch79 + 4∑
j=2
β(1+j)aj
(Lα3 − 1
α3
)
, (15)
in which L is defined as the amount of leisure and equals L = 1− (h/8736). The estimated coefficient
for leisure is household specific as they depend on the amount of children between 4-6 (ch46) and 7-9
(ch79) years old and the type of childcare used.
We assume that the density of the offered wages is distributed log normal and depends on the
potential experience (Exppot) and education level (Elow) : 9
log w = l0+l1 ln (Exppot) + l2 ln (Exppot)2+l3Elow + l4Ehigh + x, (16)
9The former is defined as her age minus years of schooling minus 6.
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in which x is a random term that is normally distributed.
The distribution of offered annual hours is assumed to be uniformly distributed except for possible
peaks at part-time and fill-time jobs. Hence, g2(h) is given by the following expression:
g2(h) =

g1 if h ∈ [52, 962[
g1 exp g2 if h ∈ [962, 1066[
g1 if h ∈ [1066, 1534[
g1 exp g3 if h ∈ [1534, 1586[
g1 if h ∈ [1586, 1950[
g1 exp g4 if h ∈ [1950, 2106[
g1 if h ∈ [2106, 3640[
. (17)
The maximum amount of hours observed in the dataset equals 3640 hours/year.
Equation 18 presents the density of childcare types in which the variable Propfor and the variable
Cov represent respectively the proportion of formal subsidized childcare and the coverage rate of
formal childcare in my municipality. The proportion of formal subsidized childcare equals the share
of subsidized facilities if the total amount of formal childcare places. The coverage rate of formal
childcare represents the amount amount of full-time formal childcare slots as a percentage of children
below the age of three years living in this specific municipality. The variable Gram and Grav repre-
sent respectively the amount of grandparents and a grandparental availability index that takes the
employment status, health of the grandparents and the distance to grandparents into account.
log g3(j) =
(
r20 + r21Propfor + r22Cov
)
a2 +
(r30 + r31Propfor + r32Cov)a3. + (18)
(r40 + r41Gram + r42Grav)a4
The ratios of the proportion of non-market opportunities with childcare type j for j = 2, 3, 4 over
the proportion of non-market opportunities without childcare (j = 1), q0j are specified as a constant:
θj = log (q0j) = log
(
p0j
p01
)
(19)
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5 Data description
This section discusses the dataset that is used for estimation and provides an overview of observed
household labour supply, income and childcare choices.
5.1 Estimation sample
This paper uses data from the 2004-2005 Flemish Families and Care survey (FFCS) that contains
a representative sample of 1275 Flemish households with a youngest child aged up to three years
old. This survey collects detailed information about childcare utilization, working hours of parents,
household income and other household characteristics.10
Several restrictions are imposed on the dataset in order to arrive at a subsample on which the model
is estimated. First, due to the limited amount of single female and male households with preschool
children, we only consider couple households. Moreover, we only consider the labour supply decision
of the mother, and focus on couples in which the father works full-time. We try to keep the model
relatively simple by focusing on this specific subgroup which represents the most common situation
among families with preschool children. Second, the analysis is restricted to households in which
both parents are potentially available for the labour market. Hence, both partners need to be aged
between 18-65 years old and are not in education, (pre)retired, disabled or ill. Third, due to a lack of
reliable information about hours worked, self-employed are left out of the sample. Households with
children already available for the labour market but still living with their parents are also excluded
from the estimation sample. For these households, it is not clear whether they see their labour supply
and childcare decisions as a collective or an individual process. Fourth, we also exclude households
with children younger than 3 months because maternity and parental leave regulations largely depress
demand for childcare services for younger children.11 After imposing these restrictions, the sample
used in the estimation consists of 552 households with at least one preschool child between 3-35
months old. Table 13 in appendix provides some descriptive statistics.
5.2 Maternal labour supply and child care usage
The survey provides detailed information about the working hours of parents. Figure 1 shows that
maternal labour supply is concentrated around several points. 17% of all mothers in the subsample
are observed not to work and we see peaks in the density at 20 hours of work, 30 hours of work and
full-time work of 40 hours.
10For more information about the FFCS, see Debacker et al. (2006).
11Haan and Wrohlich (2011) avoid estimations for all children younger than 12 months in Germany. For Belgium,
Hedebouw and Peeters (2009) clearly show that demand for childcare services in Flanders resumes at the age of 3
months old.
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Figure 1: Observed working hours mothers
In the survey, households are asked which type of childcare they most frequently use during a
normal week. According to Table 1, 36.8% of all households in the estimation sample are using
formal subsidized childcare as most frequent type of care, 20.8% use most frequently formal non-
subsidized care and 21.4% opt for informal care. 21.0% of all households report not to use childcare
as most frequent type of care for their children.12
Table 1: Type of childcare for preschool children
Number of households (%) Number of children 3-35 months
No childcare 21.0 133
Formal subsidized care 36.8 220
Formal non subsidized care 20.8 121
Informal care 21.4 125
Total 100 559
Source: Own Calculations, GEZO-data 2005
Table 2 looks more closely at the link between childcare type and maternal working hours for all
the observations in the estimation sample. Several remarks can be made when looking at the table.
First, in the large majority of all cases in which the mother is not working, no childcare is used. We
observe that 70% (= 69 of 99 households) of all households in which the mother is not working are
not using childcare. Second, and not unsurprisingly, the majority of households use childcare when
the mother is working. However, we still observe households that are not using childcare when both
parents are working. As pointed out in Ghysels and Debacker (2007), many households with two
working parents have flexible working hours and are therefore able to take care of their children and
not demand childcare.13 Third, when the mother is working full-time households opt more for formal
12In line with the literature and to keep the model relatively simple, we restrict to households in which the childcare
choice is homogeneous among the children. Households with more than one preschool child should use the same type
of care for their children. As such, 28 households are dropped from the estimation sample that report to use different
types of care for their children.
13Note that only the most frequent type of childcare is reported. Hence, it might be possible that some of these
households actually use childcare during a normal week but in a smaller amount than not using childcare.
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subsidized childcare than for informal care in comparison to part-time work.
Table 2: Childcare type and maternal labour supply
Maternal labour supply Type of childcare
No childcare Formal sub Formal non-sub Informal Total
Not working 69 14 7 9 99
Marginal part-time work 13 48 24 30 115
Part-time work 15 54 36 38 143
Full-time work 23 87 45 40 195
Total 120 203 112 117 552
Source: Own Calculations, GEZO-data 2005
The findings above might be explained by diverging preferences of households but might as well be
explained by different opportunities regarding labour supply and childcare. Some households have the
opportunity to bring their children to their parents, or have multiple options in both formal subsidized
and non-subsidized childcare. Other households, on the other hand, only have a limited amount of
formal childcare options and informal childcare is often not an option. As discussed in the previous
section, the model that we estimate takes this feature into account. Table 13 and Table 14 provide
information on some potential specific determinants of childcare. The FFCS-dataset contains very
detailed information about the availability of grandparents for care, such as the distance, number,
health and employment status. These questions are asked for each of the four grandparents, if still
alive, see table 14. We also know in which municipality each household lives. Hence, we know the
coverage rate of childcare and the proportion of both formal subsidized and non-subsidized care. The
coverage rate is defined as the number of childcare places in full time equivalent divided by the total
number of children in the age interval 0-3. On average, this coverage rate is 33% but has a relatively
large standard deviation which results in the fact that some households are more limited in their
childcare choice than others. These variables are included in Equation (18) when estimating the
opportunities of childcare, as explained in Section 4.3.
5.3 Household income and childcare costs
The model presented in Section 4 needs net disposable household income for each element of the
opportunity set. Euromod is used as microsimulation tool for the calculation of these budgetcon-
straints.14 Gross household income is equal to the sum of labour earnings of all household members.
The income tax and employee’s social security contributions are deducted from gross income, and
social transfers such as social assistance, unemployment benefits, child benefits, education benefits,
education benefits for students and housing benefits are added. Lastly, childcare costs are deducted
from this income concept to arrive at net disposable household income. These childcare costs are
simulated in Euromod, taking into account the possibility of tax deduction.
The left hand side of Figure 2 displays the observed net disposable household income for all
observations in the estimation sample. Note that income is relatively high as we focus on couple
14More information about Euromod can be found at https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/euromod.
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households with full-time working fathers. The right hand side of Figure 2 presents the total observed
childcare costs for households with at least 1 child in paid childcare. The peaks around 200 euro,
300 euro and 400 euro follow from the peaks in labour supply as shown in Figure 1. Table 3 gives an
overview of observed household income and childcare costs.
Figure 2: Net disposable income and childcare costs
Table 3: Descriptives income and childcare costs
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Net disposable household income without childcare cost 3676 975 1678 7730
Household childcare cost using paid care 293 159 9 1046
Net disposable household income with childcare costs 3508 910 1678 7416
Source: Own Calculations, GEZO-data 2005
6 Estimation results
This section discusses the estimation results, looks at the prediction performance of the model by
comparing the observed and predicted labour supply and childcare densities and calculates labour
supply elasticities both with respect to wages and childcare prices.
6.1 Estimation results and fit of the data
Table (4) presents the estimated preference parameters of the deterministic part of utility, as specified
in Equation 15. According to the significant positive estimate of α2, households value consumption
positively. The consumption and leisure exponent α1 and α3 are both significantly lower than 1
and, hence, indicate that the utility function is concave with respect to consumption and leisure.
For leisure, the curvature of the utility function is logarithmic as the estimated exponent α3 is not
significantly different from zero.
As expected, on average, households value leisure positively (β0 > 0) and having more children
between 4-6 and 7-9 years old results in a higher taste for leisure. According to the estimated
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parameters of the interaction terms of childcare type and leisure, we find that households have a
larger taste for leisure when not using childcare in comparison to both subsidized and non-subsidized
care. No such significant difference is observed between no childcare and informal care. These
preferences might be driven by the differences in childcare cost between no childcare usage and using
formal childcare and/or by the fact that young mothers prefer to raise their children themselves.15
Tables (5) and (6) present the parameters for the job and childcare opportunities. As expected,
both higher education and potential experience have a significant positive effect on wages. The
estimated distribution of offered hours, see Equation 17 and g2, g3 and g4, clearly show a peak in
the two part-time intervals and at full-time work. We also find that the logarithm of the ratio of
non-market opportunities with informal, formal subsidized and formal non-subsidized care to the
amount of non-market opportunities without childcare is significantly negative, see θ2, θ3 and θ4.
Apparently, there are more non-market alternatives without childcare than non-market alternatives
with the other three types of care. The estimates of Equation 18 show that, as expected, living in a
municipality with a higher coverage rate of formal childcare leads to more formal (both subsidized as
non-subsidized) childcare opportunities. Having more healthy and non-working grandparents that are
living nearby, i.e. a larger grandparental availability index, increases the opportunity set for informal
childcare significantly.
Table 4: Estimated preference parameters
Coeff. Std. Dev
Consumption exponent (α1) 0.726∗∗ 0.060
Consumption (α2) 10.372∗∗ 1.088
Leisure exponent (α3) 0.242 0.393
Leisure couple
Constant (β0) 45.171∗∗ 3.297
# children between 4-6 (β1) 2.680∗∗ 0.890
# children between 7-9 (β2) 4.308∗∗ 1.209
Interaction formal sub care (β3) −10.727∗∗ 1.792
Interaction formal non-sub care (β4) −13.996∗∗ 1.917
Interaction informal care (β5) −3.141 2.313
*Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level
Source: Own Calculations, GEZO-data (2005)
15Note that the differences between formal subsidized and non-subsidized childcare are not significantly different from
each other.
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Table 5: Wage equation
Coeff. Std. Dev
Constant (λ0) 2.192∗∗ 0.041
Ln (potential experience) (λ1) 2.317∗∗ 0.545
Ln (potential experience squared ) (λ2) −6.523∗∗ 2.043
Low educated (λ3) −0.237∗∗ 0.115
High educated(λ4) 0.203∗∗ 0.020
*Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level
Source: Own Calculations, GEZO-data (2005)
Table 6: Opportunities
Coeff. Std. Dev
Peak dummies
Peak dummy 1 (γ2) 0.657
∗∗ 0.162
Peak dummy 2 (γ3) 1.317
∗∗ 0.140
Peak dummy 3 (γ4) 2.146
∗∗ 0.142
Ratio non-market opportunities
θ2 −1.802∗∗ 0.489
θ3 −2.085∗∗ 0.573
θ4 −1.998∗∗ 0.590
Density formal subsidized childcare
Constant (ρ20) −1.315∗ 0.724
Proportion formal subsidzed care (ρ21) 0.460 0.534
Coverage rate (ρ22) 2.117∗∗ 1.043
Density formal non-subsidized childcare
Constant (ρ30) −0.545 0.802
Proportion formal subsidzed care (ρ31) −0.627 0.616
Coverage rate (ρ32) 2.866∗∗ 1.193
Density informal subsidized childcare
Constant (ρ40) −1.996∗∗ 0.877
Amount of grandparents (ρ41) 0.170 0.146
Grandparental availability index (ρ42) 0.298∗∗ 0.020
*Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level
Source: Own Calculations, GEZO-data (2005)
Given the estimated preferences and opportunities, a comparison of the actually observed and
simulated densities of hours of work, childcare type and consumption can be made. Given the limited
amount of observations in the dataset, the model fits the data very well, see Figure (3)-(5). The
model is able to reproduce the peaks at inactivity, marginal part-time work (17.5-20.5 hours/week),
part-time (27.5-32.5 hours/week) and full-time (36.5-40.5 hours/week) in a very precise way. The fit
of childcare type, see Figure 4, reveals that the model replicates the observed childcare usage almost
19
perfectly.
Figure 3: Fit labour supply
Figure 4: Fit childcare
Figure 5: Fit disposable income
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6.2 Labour supply responses: elasticities
An alternative way of interpreting the estimated coefficients of the previous section is by looking at
the size of labour supply responses with respect to changes in budgetary constraints. The structural
basis of the model implies that there is no explicit labour supply function from which an elasticity can
be derived. Therefore, numerical methods are used to analyse the sensitivity of labour supply with
respect to these budgetary changes. The individual’s gross wage or childcare cost is increased by 10%,
keeping all other characteristics constant. Euromod simulates the new budgetconstraint and the new
labour supply can be derived, given the estimated coefficients. We first aggregate total labour supply
of all individuals and analyze accordingly how their labour supply has changed. Table (7) and Table
(8) provides the elasticities with respect to an increase in gross hourly wage and childcare price. The
first column represents the unconditional labour supply elasticity that includes both the intensive
and extensive labour supply responses. The second column of Table (7) and Table (8) reflects only
the intensive margin of the labour market, i.e. conditional on working in the baseline situation and
the third column focuses on the extensive margin, i.e. the effect on the probability of participation
in the labour market.
The overall unconditional labour supply elasticity with respect to wages equals 1.07, in which
both the effect at the intensive margin (0.42) and at the extensive margin (0.58) are important. Not
surprisingly, the effect at the extensive margin (1.64) is of greater importance than at the intensive
margin (0.92) for individuals of the first quartile. The majority of mothers in this quartile are observed
not to work in the baseline situation. In line with other studies that apply a similar methodology
on other datasets, see Aaberge et al. (1999) and Aaberge et al. (2011) , we find that the higher
the income, the lower the labour supply responses after an increase in wages. The unconditional
labour supply elasticity with respect to childcare costs is much smaller and equals only 0.17 and is
again almost equally spread over the intensive (0.08) and extensive margin (0.10). In contrast to the
elasticities with respect to wages, we don’t observe a gradual decline in elasticity over income.
Table 7: Labor supply elasticities wrt wage increases
Unconditional elast Conditional elast Participation elast
Quartile 1 3.15 0.92 1.64
Quartile 2 0.95 0.49 0.41
Quartile 3 0.70 0.31 0.37
Quartile 4 0.33 0.20 0.18
Total 1.07 0.42 0.58
Source: Own Calculations, GEZO-data (2005)
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Table 8: Labor supply elasticities wrt childcare price increases
Unconditional elast Conditional elast Participation elast
Quartile 1 0.32 0.17 0.10
Quartile 2 0.27 0.20 0.06
Quartile 3 0.20 0.09 0.20
Quartile 4 −0.01 −0.08 0.06
Total 0.17 0.08 0.10
Source: Own Calculations, GEZO-data (2005)
7 Childcare availability and labour supply
As discussed before, increasing childcare availability for preschool children is one of the main targets
of the new decree of the Flemish government. In 2016, 50% of all Flemish preschool children should
find suitable childcare and this availability problem must be completely solved by 2020. The model
presented in this paper serves as an instrument to investigate how Flemish households alter their
childcare and labour supply decisions when childcare opportunities change. More specifically, in a
first counterfactual, we increase the coverage rate of formal childcare up to 50%. In the second
simulation, we assume that each child finds childcare as we increase the coverage rate up to 100%.
As discussed before, see Section 4.2 and Table 6, formal childcare coverage partly determines the
childcare opportunities of each household. Hence, due to the increased availability of formal childcare,
households are confronted with opportunity sets in which the share of formal childcare facilities
increases in comparison to the other types of care. Given this higher coverage rate, we simulate the
model by using the estimated parameters and are able to derive the new childcare and labour supply
decisions of households.
Several scenarios are conceivable. First, given the estimated preferences and unobserved hetero-
geneity in preferences, households might decide to switch from childcare type as the relative share
of formal childcare increases in their opportunity set. Second, higher childcare availability might
also affect maternal labour supply decisions. Households that used to be restricted in their access to
childcare and, hence, were not working, might enter the labour market. Behavioural responses at the
intensive margin of the labour market might arise as well. Households that, due to restricted acces
to formal childcare, had to rely on informal or no care and, hence, only worked a limited amount
of hours, have now the opportunity to switch from childcare type. The sign of their labour supply
response is ambiguous as two competing income and substitution effects come to the fore. Switching
from free childcare (informal or no care) to formal paid care implies an income effect that leads to an
increase in labour supply and a substitution effect that reduces labour supply. Households now have
to pay childcare costs which implies that they need to work more hours in order to obtain the same
amount of income; an income effect. On the other hand, childcare leads to a decrease in wages which
results in cheaper leisure and, given that leisure is a normal good, lower labour supply; a substitution
effect. Therefore, in advance, we cannot unambigiously say how labour supply changes after the
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increase in coverage rate.
Table 9 presents an overview of the childcare type densities, both in baseline and counterfactual
situations. We clearly see that households switch from childcare type if the coverage rate of formal
childcare increases. In the baseline situation, 36.8% and 20.8% of all households made use of respec-
tively formal subsidized and formal non-subsidized childcare. When the coverage rate grows to 50%,
these percentages jump up to 41.1% and 26.8% respectively. A coverage rate of 100% even leads to a
density of formal subsidized care of 45.7% and 38.4% for formal non-subsidized care. Larger opportu-
nity sets clearly affect the household’s choice of childcare. Although the parameter estimates in Table
4 suggest that households prefer leisure time when using no childcare of informal care, it appears that
the random component of utility contains elements that are in favour of formal childcare. The belief
of housholds that the social interaction with other children is beneficial for the development of their
child might be such an element.
Table 9: Child care densities
Childcare type Baseline 50% coverage rate 100% coverage rate
No childcare 21.0 16.8 8.5
Formal subsidized childcare 36.8 41.1 45.7
Formal non-subsidized childcare 20.8 26.8 38.4
Informal childcare 21.4 15.2 7.4
Source: Own Calculations, GEZO-data (2005)
Not only the childcare choice is affected by a higher coverage rate, also the labour supply decisions
of households change, see Table 10. First, the participation rate of women in this subsample increases
from 83.1% to 84.7% if the coverage rate equals 50% and even jumps up to 87.9% if formal childcare is
available for each child. Hence, mothers decide to start working if more childcare is available. Below
we provide more details on these transitions. Second, total labour supply expressed in Full Time
Equivalents (FTE) increases with 2.1% in the first counterfactual and raises with 6.7% in the second
simulation. However, as discussed above, it might be that some mothers reduce their labour supply,
whereas others work more when being confronted with a larger coverage rate. The next tables look
in detail to the different transitions between labour supply, cominded with the change in childcare
type.
Table 10: Labour supply responses
Childcare type Baseline 50% coverage rate 100% coverage rate
Participation rate 83.1 84.7 87.9
Labour supply in FTE (pct. change) 47, 418 48, 409 (+ 2.1%) 50, 584 (+ 6.7%)
Source: Own Calculations, GEZO-data (2005); FTE is defined as total yearly hours divided by 2000
Table 11 and Table 12 look more in detail to the individual transititions of mothers regarding
to childcare type and labour supply. The first column reflects the change in childcare type, the
second column presents an indicator whether the mother starts working (extensive margin) and the
third whether the mother increases her labour supply (positive intensive margin). The fourth column
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reflects an indicator whether the mother stops working and the last column whether she reduces her
labour supply model but remains at work (negative intensive).
Looking at the counterfactual in which the coverage rate augments to 50%, several important
findings can be noted. First, as suggested in the second allinea of this section, there are both
households that increase (38/512) and reduce (23/512) labour supply. Second, when looking more
into detail to households with a positive change in labour supply (column 2 and 3), we see that
11/38 start working. These households switch from no childcare to formal care; both subsidized and
non-subsidized. Hence, it might be reasonable to state that these households where restricted in
their childcare choice in the baseline situation and were therefore not able to supply labour. Third,
the remaining part (27/38) increase their labour supply at the intensive margin. We observe both
changes from no childcare and from informal care to formal childcare. For these households, a rise in
the availability of formal childcare leads to more formal care opportunities and, given the estimated
preferences and opportunities, they decide to switch to formal care. However, as discussed above,
this switch implies a positive income effect and a negative substitution effect. For these particular
households, the former dominates the latter and labour supply increases. However, looking at the
last column, we see that 21 households reduce their labour supply at the intensive level of the market.
These households switch, in line with those that increase their labour supply (column 3), from no
childcare or informal care to formal childcare. For these households, the negative substitution effects
dominates the positive income effect.
Eventually, as stated in Table 10, total labour supply increases with 990 FTE but it is important
to note that this figure is a combination of both positive and negative labour supply reactions. Table
12 leads to the same conclusions as Table 11, although the effects are more pronounced.
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Table 11: Individual transitions: coverage rate to 50%
Childcare respons Labour supply response
Pos. ext. margin Pos. int. margin Neg. ext. margin Neg. int. margin
1 to 2 6 4 0 3
1 to 3 5 4 0 0
1 to 4 0 0 0 0
2 to 1 0 0 0 0
2 to 3 0 3 1 2
1 to 4 0 0 0 0
3 to 1 0 0 0 0
3 to 2 0 0 0 0
3 to 4 0 0 0 0
4 to 1 0 0 0 0
4 to 2 0 9 0 7
4 to 3 0 7 1 9
Total 11 27 2 21
Type 1: no childcare, type 2: formal subsidized care, type 3: formal non-subsidized care, type 4: informal care
Source: Own Calculations, GEZO-data (2005)
Table 12: Individual transitions: coverage rate to 100%
Childcare respons Labour supply response
Pos. ext. margin Pos. int. margin Neg. ext. margin Neg. int. margin
1 to 2 13 10 0 5
1 to 3 17 11 2 6
1 to 4 0 0 0 0
2 to 1 0 0 0 0
2 to 3 0 8 1 6
1 to 4 0 0 0 0
3 to 1 0 0 0 0
3 to 2 0 0 6 0
3 to 4 0 0 0 0
4 to 1 0 0 0 0
4 to 2 2 13 2 15
4 to 3 2 22 1 18
Total 34 64 6 50
Type 1: no childcare, type 2: formal subsidized care, type 3: formal non-subsidized care, type 4: informal care
Source: Own Calculations, GEZO-data (2005)
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8 Conclusion
This paper presented a structural random utility model in which the simultaneous labour supply
and childcare decision of married mothers is estimated. In contrast to the more conventional labour
supply model as suggested in Van Soest (1995), we adopted and elaborated the framework developed
by Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strom (1995) in which we assume that each household is confronted with
heterogeneous opportunity sets. Each point in the opportunity set is characterized by hours of
work, wage rate, type of childcare and other non-pecuniary attributes. This methodology appears
very convenient as the childcare sector in Flanders is characterized by a high regional variability in
childcare supply.
The model is used to simulate the potential labour supply and childcare reactions of higher
childcare availability. In April 2012, the Flemish government approved a new decree in which the
coverage rate of childcare increases up to 50% in 2016 and becomes completely available in 2020. We
find substantial behavioural responses in the choice of childcare type. The relative importance of
informal childcare declines in favour of formal childcare arragnments. Additionally, the participation
rate of mothers increases further as they are less restricted in their childcare choice. However, the
labour supply effects at the intensive margin of the labour market are less straightforward. Switching
from childcare type implies a negative subsitution and a positive income effect. Hence, it is not
unambigiously clear how labour supply adjusts when the availability of childcare increases. The
simulation results suggest that the positive income effects dominate the negative substitution effects.
Consequently, total labour supply increases with 2.1% in the case of a coverage rate of 50% and with
6.7% in the case of a coverage rate of 100%.
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Appendix
Descriptive statistics
Table 13: Descriptive statistics
Description Mean Min Max St. Dev.
Age of the child (months) 21.2 3 36 8.6
# 0-3 year old children 1.1 0.3 1 2
Age mother (years) 33.3 17 47 4.5
Age father (years) 36.9 24 57 5.1
Working hours mother 26.1 0 74.9 14.7
Working hours father 42.8 30 99.0 8.3
Hourly wage mother 17.1 4.1 40.8 5.1
Hourly wage father 18.5 4.2 71.3 7.3
Health mother (0/1) 0.99 0.10 0 1
Health father (0/1) 0.99 0.10 0 1
Child with special needs (0/1 variable) 0.02 0.1 0 1
Childcare coverage rate in municipality 0.34 0.10 0.80 0.11
Proportion formal subsidized care 0.71 0.19 1.00 0.20
Proportion formal non-subsidized care 0.29 0 0.81 0.20
Education mother:
Low educated 1.2%
Middle educated 34.0%
High educated 64.7%
Education father:
Low educated 3.4%
Middle educated 47.4%
High educated 49.2%
Type of municipality:
Residential 21.8%
Rural community 16.0%
Economically centered 13.3%
Semi urban 14.0%
Urban 33.8%
Touristic 1.3%
Number of observations 552
Source: Own Calculations, GEZO-data 2005
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Table 14: Grandparents variables
Grandparents number: 1 2 3 4
Mean distance if present:
0-5 km 42.5% 41.5% 37.9% 38.5%
5-15 km 24.9% 22.4% 25.8% 25.6%
15-50 km 18.8% 20.5% 21.3% 19.7%
50 or more 14.2% 15.6% 14.7% 15.8%
Childcare:
Never 21.9% 31.7% 35.0% 41.7%
Rarely 20.0% 19.7% 22.1% 14.6%
Sometimes 30.0% 25.5% 24.8% 25.6%
Often 24.1% 19.9% 16.1% 15.8%
Always 3.6% 3.0% 1.8% 2.0%
Good health if present (0/1) 0.92 0.94 0.91 0.94
Employment status if presents (0/1) 0.80 0.75 0.80 0.73
Source: Own Calculations, GEZO-data 2005
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